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ABSTRACT
This paper looks empirically into the behavior of multinational firms in international oligopolistic
markets with trade balance constraints. I show how a particular form of non-tariff barrier applied at
the firm level can lead to an increase in trade flows in the presence of intra-firm strategic trade. In
my application, I estimate a model of demand, supply and trade policy in the automobile sector in
Argentina and Brazil during 1996-1999.
I measure the economic impact of a trade balance constraint that was in effect during that period and
I compute predicted economic outcomes for the full adoption of a customs union, as has been agreed
as part of the Mercosur negotiations, separating the sometimes opposing impacts of the removal of
non-tariff barriers and the adoption of a common external tariff. Results show that the elimination
of non-tariff barriers dominates the leveling of tariffs. Imports from outside of Mercosur increase
under the new regime even though tariffs against these goods become more discriminatory, and
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This paper looks empirically into the behavior of multinational ﬁrms in international oligopolistic
markets with trade balance constraints. I show how a particular form of non-tariﬀ barrier applied
at the ﬁrm level can lead to an increase in trade ﬂows in the presence of intra-ﬁrm strategic trade.
In my application, I estimate a model of demand, supply and trade policy in the automobile sector
in Argentina and Brazil during 1996-1999. I measure the economic impact of a trade balance
constraint that was in eﬀect during that period and I compute predicted economic outcomes for
the full adoption of a customs union, as it has been agreed as part of the Mercosur negotiations.
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay formed a customs union - Mercosur - in 1995. The
inclusion of the automobile sector was initially negotiated for 2000, with programmed tariﬀ and
non-tariﬀ barriers (NTBs) phase-outs during 1996-1999. The complete elimination of the NTBs
was later postponed until 2006.
During the period 1996-1999, there were two non-tariﬀ barriers in place both from the Argentine
and from the Brazilian sides: there was a quota on bilateral net imports, and there was a trade
balance constraint on global trade. Both of these restrictions were applied to each car manufacturer
in each of the two countries. The trade balance requirement restricted the value of imports of a
particular ﬁrm to be less or equal to the value of its exports plus some additional export credits.
Both imports and exports from the partner (Argentina and Brazil) and from other countries were
included in the trade balance requirement.
I model the behavior of the car manufacturers in Argentina and Brazil and incorporate the
eﬀects of tariﬀs and NTBs into their price decision making. I ﬁrst show that the eﬀect of the trade
balance constraint is qualitatively not determined. The combination of trade balance constraints
with strategic intra-ﬁrm trade can lead to artiﬁcially high bilateral trade. The reason is that a given
ﬁrm needs to satisfy the constraints in both countries and can use bilateral trade as an instrument
to increase exports in the country where they are most needed. When NTBs are eliminated, the
directions of change in bilateral ﬂows are a priori unpredictable. The evaluation of the eﬀect of
trade balance constraint on trade ﬂows shades light both on the behavior of multinational ﬁrms
under this particular trade policy and on the direction in which trade is going to move after the
customs union is fully adopted.
In addition, the Mercosur negotiations involve the adoption of a common external tariﬀ which is
higher than the average tariﬀs in Argentina and Brazil during 1996-1999. Thus, the customs union
1agreement involves two opposing changes in trade policy that have an impact on external imports:
the increase in the external tariﬀ - which favors imports from the partners and domestic production
in detriment of imports from other countries - and the removal of the trade balance constraint -
which leads to an increase in external imports. Whether the trade diverting eﬀect of the increase
in the tariﬀ level is more than compensated by the trade creating eﬀect from eliminating the trade
balance constraint is again an empirical question.
I estimate the imposed cost of the NTBs and simulate a counterfactual equilibrium in which
the NTBs are removed and the common external tariﬀ is adopted. By comparing the observed
and predicted equilibrium outcomes during 1996-1999, I asses the impact of the customs union
on prices, trade ﬂows, revenue, proﬁts and welfare. Moreover, by computing an intermediate
equilibrium without NTBs but with the diﬀerent tariﬀ levels that were in eﬀect during 1996-1999,
I decompose the eﬀects of the two policy changes.
I ﬁnd that the elimination of non-tariﬀ barriers dominates the levelling of tariﬀs for all the
eﬀects that I measure. In particular, imports from outside of Mercosur increase under the new
regime even though tariﬀs against these goods become more discriminatory. Another ﬁnding is
that the trade balance constraint imposes a higher cost to Brazilian subsidiaries relative to their
Argentine counterparts leading to excessive exports from Brazil to Argentina. Hence, under the
customs union regime, exports from Brazil to Argentina are predicted to decrease.
Previous evaluations of trade policy in automobile markets have looked at the voluntary export
restraint (VER) of Japanese vehicles exported to the U.S. that was set up in 1981. Dixit (1988)
calibrates a model with two diﬀerentiated products, American and Japanese. He computes the
optimal tariﬀ on cars and ﬁnds that restricting Japanese imports, by means of a higher tariﬀ,
would have been welfare enhancing for the U.S.. Feenstra (1984) and (1988) estimates the increase
in prices of Japanese cars that was due to the VER. He shows that part of the increase in prices
is explained by an upgrade in quality. Goldberg (1995) estimates a structural model of supply and
demand in the U.S. market and simulates the counterfactual equilibrium without the VER. Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) run a similar exercise with a diﬀerent demand speciﬁcation. Verboven
(1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001) estimate structural models of supply and demand in the
European car market and indirectly focus on restrictions to Japanese car model in the context of
the study of price discrimination and price dispersion across several European countries.
The empirical strategy that I adopt is very similar in spirit to Goldberg (1995) and Berry,
2Levinsohn and Pakes (1999). The estimation method consists on specifying a full structural model
of the behavior of the ﬁrms - including the choice variables, the nature of the competition and other
factors inﬂuencing the market - which can be summarized by a system of ﬁrst order conditions. Such
system includes prices, marginal costs, costs imposed by trade policy, and a demand function and
price derivatives (or elasticities). If prices, quantities and price derivatives are observed, the cost of
each diﬀerentiated product can be estimated by ﬁnding the values of the cost that satisfy the system
of ﬁrst order conditions. Firms choose prices (or quantities) given a demand function and marginal
costs; the researcher works backwards, given the observed prices and the demand function, the
marginal cost that generated those decisions can be recovered. In practice, the demand functions
are not observed and need to be estimated, either as a ﬁrst step or jointly with the supply side.
The recovered marginal costs reﬂect both the cost of production and the costs imposed by
trade policy and it is necessary to disentangle the two of them to be able to run a counterfactual
exercise that involves a change in trade policy. The previous structural studies specify a parametric
functional form for the cost function in which the production cost depends on physical attributes
of the automobiles. Instead of estimating the production cost of each car directly, they reduce
the number of parameters by estimating the coeﬃcients of a cost function (plus the trade policy
parameters). This procedure imposes further functional forms assumptions on a method that is
already substantially relying on structure.
In my application, I estimate a model of supply and trade policy in the automobile sector in
two countries - Argentina and Brazil. Since automobile ﬁrms are subsidiaries of multinational
corporations, the same agents are located in the two countries and maximize proﬁts jointly in the
two markets. In terms of the estimation method, this translates into observing two sets of quantities,
prices and demand derivatives (one in Argentina and one in Brazil) while only one marginal costs
for each model (since each model is produced in only one country). I develop a minimum distance
estimator that takes advantage of the additional information from multiple equilibrium outcomes
(in this case two) and allows me to estimate the production cost and the trade policy parameters
directly from the behavior of ﬁrms, without imposing functional form assumptions on costs of
production.
This approach is suitable for applications in which there are data of product sales and prices
on more than one market but only one production cost. It is natural to apply the procedure
to trade models - as in Verboven (1996) and Goldberg and Verboven (2001),- it is also suitable
3for closed-economy industrial organization applications with demand and price data on diﬀerent
jurisdictions.
On the demand side, I adopt the random coeﬃcients model of Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn
and Pakes (1995). The procedure to estimate the supply side, however, is independent of the chosen
demand model.
In Section 2, I describe the characteristics of the automobile market in Argentina and Brazil
including the trade policy. In Section 3, I formalize the description of the industry into a model
of oligopoly with diﬀerentiated products. The estimation details of the supply side can be found
in Section 4. Section 5 describes the data and the results of the estimation both of supply and
demand parameters. Section 6 presents the description and results of the counterfactual adoption
of a customs union as has been scheduled for 2006.
2 Automobile market and trade policy
Automobiles are produced in Argentina and Brazil by subsidiaries of multinational corporations,
most of them associated with local investors. The ﬁrms located in the area are Ford, General Motors,
Chrysler, Fiat, Volkswagen, Mercedes Benz, Peugeot-Citro¨ en, Renault, Toyota and Honda.1 There
are no purely domestic ﬁrms, and the participation of local capital in the joint ventures with
multinationals is minoritarian.
All these ﬁrms have production facilities in both countries. Renault, Toyota and
Peugeot-Citro¨ en have regional headquarters in Argentina, while the remaining ﬁrms are primarily
based in Brazil. Generally, the car models produced in Argentina are diﬀerent from the models
produced in Brazil. In some cases, there are overlaps of the main production lines across the two
countries but the models maintain some distinctive features such as diﬀerent engine size or number
of doors. For example, between 1996 and 1997, Honda manufactured the Accord in Argentina and
the Civic in Brazil (diﬀerent production lines); while between 1996 and 1999, Ford produced the
Escort in Argentina with the exception of the 1,000cc engine size version, that was produced in
Brazil (same production line but diﬀerent ﬁnal models).
Firms trade models between Argentina and Brazil and also import and export from and to other
countries. The largest fraction of trade is bilateral. Other export destinations are Latin America
and Europe, primarily Italy and France, although this varies substantially by year. Cars produced
1Chrysler and Mercedes Benz merged in 2000 and formed Daimler-Chrysler
4in Argentina and Brazil are mostly compact, small and medium sized, while models imported from
other countries include larger vehicles and SUVs. Brazil tends to specialize in smaller models than
Argentina. Trade in ﬁnished vehicles is a large fraction of bilateral trade. For example, in 1997,
imports of cars accounted for more than 17% of Brazilian imports from Argentina, and 10% of
Argentine imports from Brazil.
There are also car manufacturers that do not have production facilities in the area and whose
cars are only available in Argentina and Brazil through imports. The most important among these
corporations in terms of sales during the second half of the 1990’s are Rover, Isuzu and Daewoo.
These ﬁrms are subject to a diﬀerent -more restrictive- trade regime in both countries and account
for less than 10 percent of domestic sales in Argentina and Brazil. Throughout this paper, I focus on
demand and supply for cars produced domestically in Argentina or Brazil or imported by ﬁrms with
local production facilities. Finally, there are ﬁrms that, although they do not produce in Argentina
or Brazil, have merged or established partnerships with ﬁrms that do have local production (for
example, Alfa Romeo and Fiat). These ﬁrms are subject to the trade regime described above and I
do include them in the analysis by considering that their car models are traded by the local ﬁrms.
The total number of vehicles sold and the share of each corporation in local production are
displayed in Table 1 for the period 1996-1999. During these four years, approximately 1 million
new cars were sold in Argentina and 5 million in Brazil (this 1 to 5 relation is similar to the ratio
of populations in the two countries). In Argentina, 70 percent of the number of cars is produced
domestically, while 14.4 percent are imports from Brazil and the remaining 16 percent are imports
from other countries. In Brazil, 83 percent of units are produced domestically and 13.5 percent
of cars originated in Argentina; imports from other countries only account for less than 4 percent.
The market in Brazil is dominated by Fiat, General Motors and Volkswagen which account for
85 percent of the number of vehicles sold. Participation of ﬁrms is more evenly distributed in
Argentina, with Fiat and Renault accounting for 46 percent of total units, followed by Volkswagen,
Ford, Peugeot-Citro¨ en and General Motors.
In Argentina, imports from Brazil receive a diﬀerent treatment from imports from other
countries, and vice versa in Brazil. Trade policy is subject to continuous negotiations both between
the two countries and between authorities and ﬁrms. There is no arbitrage between bilateral imports
and imports from other countries. For example, a car entering Argentina from Brazil is considered
a bilateral import only if it was indeed produced in Brazil. If it was produced elsewhere, it is
5considered a non-Brazilian import and subject to the appropriate trade restrictions. In addition,
there are regional content agreements: a car produced in Brazil is subject to the bilateral imports
trade policy if 60 to 70 percent of its components originated in Mercosur countries. The exact
percentages vary by year and depend on the year of introduction of the car model - new car models
are allowed to have larger fractions of foreign components.
Historically, the industry has been heavily protected in Argentina and Brazil with very few
imports during the 1980s. The ﬁrst liberalization episode took place in 1990 when the two countries
agreed to eliminate tariﬀs for bilateral imports, but kept tariﬀs on imports from other countries.
They also set quotas on bilateral net imported units in both countries that were in place until
the year 2000. By these quotas, the number of imported units could not exceed the number of
exported units by more than a negotiated limit. The purpose was to balance bilateral trade in
units. These quotas were negotiated by the two countries and then arbitrarily assigned to the
individual ﬁrms presumably based on past participation in the market. Each country kept its
own tariﬀ rate on imports from other countries and later imposed a global trade balance constraint
(GTB) that restricted the total value of imports to be less or equal to the total value of exports
(further described below). Trade of vehicles grew rapidly and accounted for a large part of total
bilateral trade.
In 1995, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay formed a customs union (Mercosur). A
customs union implies that there is free internal trade between partners (no tariﬀs or non-tariﬀ
barriers) and a common external tariﬀ for imports from outside the union. The automobile sector
received a diﬀerent treatment from other goods. The sector was initially left out of the agreement
and its incorporation was scheduled for 2000 (and later postponed until 2006). The years 1996-1999
were established as an initial period to phase-out tariﬀs and non-tariﬀ barriers and the Mercosur
trade partners signed bilateral agreements that regulated trade in cars until the customs union
was fully achieved. I refer to this transition from the beginning of 1996 to the end of 1999 as the
convergence period. The change in trade barriers from the convergence period to the customs union
is the focus of this study.
Before the formal adoption of Mercosur, at the beginning of 1995, imports from third countries
were subject to a tariﬀ of 2 percent in Argentina and 32 percent in Brazil. The Mercosur members
agreed to adopt a common external tariﬀ of 35 percent by the end of 1999. Convergence to the
common rate was gradual in Argentina, with steady trimestral increases. In Brazil, it was more
6erratic, although never higher than 35 percent (it reached 35 percent in 1996 and in 1999). The







The tariﬀ for bilateral trade was zero since 1990 and continued to be zero during 1996-1999
and afterwards. The implementation of non-tariﬀ barriers was more complicated as it involved
two diﬀerent policy interventions. From 1996 to 1999, imports were subject to an intertemporal
global trade balance constraint (GTB) in each country, which stipulated that for each ﬁrm the
value of imports could not exceed the value of exports (plus other export credits) during the entire
convergence period. Trade ﬂows with both the partner and with other countries were included in
the computation of the trade balance constraints. Exports were multiplied by a factor of 1.2.3 In
addition, ﬁrms were granted export credits that could be included in the value of exports for trade
balance purposes. Investment in capital goods and net exports of auto-parts were considered export
credits (which were not multiplied by 1.2). Firms could also buy export credits from independent
component producers.








































Firms faced an analogous constraint in Brazil and had to satisfy both of them intertemporally,
during 1996-1999. At the beginning of the period, each ﬁrm presented an investment and trade
plan for the following four years, which had to be approved by the authorities. In addition to the
GTB, there were the quotas on net bilateral imports described above.
2Imports from Uruguay received special treatment as well, but I do not describe that here.
3This coeﬃcient can in principle be managed by the authorities to introduce slack into the constraint. In practice,
it remained constant during the 4 year period 1996-1999.
7In 2000 the two non-tariﬀ barriers (global trade balance and bilateral quotas) were eliminated.
However, the objective of free trade between partners agreed upon in 1995 was not achieved.
The 1996-1999 non-tariﬀ barriers were replaced by a new form of NTB. Implementation of the
full customs union was deferred until 2006. The following table summarizes the regime during
1996-1999 and the planned customs union
Convergence Period (1996-1999) Customs Union
Internal tariﬀ: 0% Internal tariﬀ: 0%
Diﬀerent external tariﬀ (≤35%) Common external tariﬀ (35%)
Global Trade Balance (GTB)
Quota on net Imports
In this study, I compare the policy during the convergence period with the projected policy for
the customs union. I estimate demand and production cost using observed data during 1996-1999
and in a second step use the results to predict counterfactual outcomes for the planned customs
union.
Expected changes in trade ﬂows
There are two changes in trade policy that I evaluate via the counterfactual analysis: the
adoption of a common external tariﬀ and the elimination of the NTBs. The adoption of the
common external tariﬀ of 35 percent involves a large increase in the tariﬀ level in Argentina (28
to 18 percentage points depending on the year) which makes external imports substantially more
costly relative to the actual trade policy during 1996-1999. The price of car models imported from
non-Mercosur countries is expected to increase in Argentina after the adoption in the common
external tariﬀ and imports are expected to decrease. The expected changes are the same in Brazil
but of a smaller magnitude as the actual tariﬀ level during the convergence period is substantially
higher in Brazil than in Argentina. In both countries, as external imports become more expensive,
external trade is diverted towards bilateral imports and domestic production. The bilateral tariﬀ
level was already zero prior to the customs union agreement and therefore there is no trade creation
from the change in tariﬀs.
The eﬀects of removing the global trade balance constraint are more complicated. Due to the
strategic behavior of the ﬁrms across the two countries, removing the NTBs is a movement towards
free trade but not necessarily towards more trade. Trade is intra-ﬁrm and the corporations can
8manage trade ﬂows to satisfy the trade balance constraint in Argentina and Brazil simultaneously.
Suppose that for a given ﬁrm the GTB is less binding in Argentina than in Brazil. The ﬁrm has
an incentive to increase its exports of Brazilian models to Argentina in order to loosen the GTB in
Brazil. By this mechanism, ﬁrms can shift export credits across countries according to where they
are most needed. They can use the export credits to increase imports from other countries.4 For this
particular ﬁrm, imports from Brazil to Argentina are artiﬁcially high due to the constraint, while
imports from Argentina to Brazil are artiﬁcially low. The removal of the trade balance constraint
implies a decrease of trade in one direction and an increase in the other. The answer needs to be
found empirically. In Sections (5) and (6) I ﬁnd that the GTB is more binding in Brazil and that
Brazilian exports to Argentina decrease when the constraint is removed.
The eﬀect of the GTB on external imports is not ambiguous. The price decision for exports
to countries outside of Mercosur is exogenous to the multinationals’ regional headquarters and do
not take into account the eﬀects on the trade balance constraint in Argentina and Brazil. Hence,
there are no incentives to switch exports credits from or to other countries. The constraint reduces
trade and external imports are expected to increase under the customs union. Notice that the total
change in external imports due to the adoption of the customs union is driven by two opposite
forces: the increase in the external tariﬀ and the removal of the GTB. I ﬁnd that removing the
GTB has a larger impact, meaning that external imports increase in the counterfactual adoption
of the customs union.
3 A model of ﬁrm behavior under trade restrictions
I model the supply side of the car market as a diﬀerentiated-product oligopoly with price
competition. There are F multinational corporations with subsidiaries in the area, indexed by f.
Each ﬁrm has production facilities both in Argentina and in Brazil. In each of the two countries,
ﬁrms sell cars produced domestically, cars imported from the trade partner (Argentina or Brazil)
and cars imported from other countries. Let Aft, Bft and Wft denote the sets of cars produced by




ft are the sets of cars sold in Brazil. In principle, the sets of cars sold in
Argentina and Brazil can diﬀer.
4Ideally, ﬁrms would like to shift export credits until the constraints were equally binding in both countries,
however, the bilateral quotas set a limit to the possibility to arbitrage.
9Models are indexed by j. A given model j sold in Argentina or Brazil is not produced in more
than one country at the same time. Producers face constant marginal costs for each model, given
by cjt (t indexes time). For modelling purposes, it would be possible to specify a more general cost
function in which the marginal cost depended on the quantity produced. However, for estimation
purposes, it would require data on total quantity produced, which is not available for cars produced
in countries other than Argentina and Brazil. The constant marginal cost assumption side-steps
this restriction imposed by data unavailability.





t), in Argentina and Brazil respectively; where Pa
t is the price vector of all car models sold
in Argentina and Pb
t its counterpart in Brazil. Demand functions vary by country and by time
period, and they are independent across countries and time. It is assumed that demand is static
and individuals do not consider future changes in prices in current decisions.
Bilateral imports are free of taxes, whereas outside imports face a tariﬀ τa
t in Argentina and
τb
t in Brazil. These tariﬀs are diﬀerent in the two countries and vary by year. Tariﬀs are applied
to the price at which car models are traded internationally, not the price at which they are sold
to consumers. Since all trade is intra-ﬁrm, ﬁrms can in principle choose convenient transfer prices
to minimize the eﬀects of tariﬀs and NTBs and to switch proﬁts across countries depending on
corporate tax rates. However, in practice, customs authorities elaborate guidelines of values per
model from which the values reported by ﬁrms cannot disagree substantially; the testimony of
industry experts suggests that these values are reasonably close to the costs of production. Since
I do not observe the prices at which ﬁrms trade internationally in the data, I assume that ﬁrms
trade at marginal cost.
Let pa
jt be the retail price of model j in Argentina, and pb
jt the price of the same model in Brazil.
Firm f’s proﬁts in each country are given by the sum of proﬁts over all its models. Separating the
car models by origin – Argentina, Brazil, and the rest of the world,– proﬁts in period t in Argentina
















































Firms compete in prices taking the demand functions and the price of the competitors as given.
In each time period, they choose two prices for each car model, one for Argentina, pa
jt, and one for
Brazil, pb
jt. When setting the price of a particular model, ﬁrms take into account the eﬀect on the
demand for all models that they manufacture. Furthermore, characteristics of the products and
entry-exit decisions are assumed to be exogenous to the pricing decision.
As described so far, the problems in the two countries are independent because of the constant
marginal cost assumption, meaning that prices in Brazil - or in any other country - do not aﬀect
prices in Argentina and vice versa. However, the price decisions need to contemplate the restrictions
imposed by trade policy. The non-tariﬀ barriers link the decisions in the two countries.
Imports by each ﬁrm, in each country, are subject to the intertemporal global trade balance
constraint (GTB). The cumulative value of imports during the period in which the GTB was in
place cannot exceed the cumulative value of exports. Let T0 denote this period, which in practice
corresponds to the convergence period 1996-1999. In addition, there is an annual quota for net
imports from the trade partner (measured in units).
























































The left-hand side corresponds to ﬁrm f’s imports, and the right-hand side to its exports. Exports
of ﬁnished vehicles are multiplied by 1.2. Export credits from the acquisition or export of capital
11goods and net exports of components are included in the exogenous terms Xa
f and Xb
f. Exports to




The bilateral quantitative constraints dictate that net imports cannot exceed a negotiated
annual limit (quota) in each country. I model each ﬁrm’s constraint as a lower and an upper
bound on net imports of the Brazilian subsidiary, Q
ft and Qft, exogenously assigned.5 The lower

















 ≤ Qft. (5)
Each ﬁrm maximizes proﬁts during T0 subject to the global and bilateral constraints. Given the
particular ownership structure of the ﬁrms, in which the same corporations are located in Argentina
and Brazil, the constraints link the equilibria in the two countries. When ﬁrms set prices, they add
to the usual determinants of equilibrium - competition among ﬁrms and among products within
the same ﬁrm - the restrictions imposed by trade policy. They manipulate imports and exports
in both locations to satisfy the trade balance constraints and the quotas on net imports. Hence,
prices in Brazil aﬀect prices in Argentina, and vice versa.










opposite sides of the Argentine and Brazilian trade balance equations (3) and (4). The ﬁrst term,
for example, are imports from Brazil to Argentina. These imports are counted in both constraints,
once as Argentine imports and a second time as Brazilian exports. They tighten the constraint
in Argentina while loosening it in Brazil. Firms can manipulate both these terms (via prices) to
satisfy the balance constraints simultaneously. In particular they can export from the country
where export credits are most needed. This situation can lead to artiﬁcially high bilateral trade
due to the GTBs. In addition, since exports are multiplied by 1.2, bilateral trade can be artiﬁcially
high in both directions.
Let λa
f and λb
f be the Lagrange multipliers associated to the GTBs in Argentina and Brazil
respectively; and let µa
ft and µb
ft denote the multipliers associated to the bilateral quantitative
constraint (µa
ft is associated to the lower bound, the quota in Argentina, and µb
ft to the upper
bound, the quota in Brazil). The ﬁrst two are constant across time because there is a single
5Anecdotal evidence suggests that they were assigned according to previous shares in imports and production.
12cumulative constraint; the latter two, on the other hand, vary annually.
Let qh
ft(Ph
t ) and ph
ft be the vectors of demand and prices of ﬁrm f in country h (with h = a,b,
Argentina and Brazil), and ∆h
ft(Ph
t ) its matrix of partial derivatives of demand with respect to
price, with ∆h
ft(Ph
t )(ij) = ∂qh
it/∂ph
jt(Ph
t ). The ﬁrst order conditions for ﬁrm f in period t and in
















ft is a vector of adjusted marginal costs, deﬁned as the production marginal costs augmented
by the implicit costs imposed by the trade taxes and restrictions. The deﬁnition of adjusted
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ft) for j ∈ Bft
cjt(1 + τa
t )(1 + λa





   





ft) for j ∈ A0
ft
cjt for j ∈ B0
ft
cjt(1 + τb
t )(1 + λb
f) for j ∈ W0
ft
For a car produced and sold in Argentina (j ∈ Aft), the relevant cost for the price decision is the
marginal cost of production - there is no adjustment. In the case of a car produced in a third
country and imported into Argentina (j ∈ Wft), the relevant cost is the production cost augmented
by the percentage increase due to the tariﬀ (1 + τa
t ) and the shadow increase in cost due to the
GTB constraint (1+λa
f). When a car is imported from Brazil to Argentina (j ∈ Bft), the cost does
not include a tariﬀ since the bilateral tariﬀ is zero, but there are two NTBs that apply, the GTB
and the net quota on imports. The cost of imports from Brazil is increased by (100 × λa
f) percent
because each unit imported tightens the Argentine GTB. At the same time, each such export from
Brazil helps relax the Brazilian GTB, which reduces the cost by (100 × 1.2λb
f) percent. The net
eﬀect of the GTB in Argentina is λa
f − 1.2λb
f, which can be positive or negative. If this term is
negative, imports are larger than without the GTB. In addition, there is the cost imposed by the
net quota, given by µa
ft −µb
ft. If the bound in binding in Argentina, µa
ft is positive and µb
ft is zero.
13This cost is additive and not multiplicative because the quota applies to units instead of values.
Notice that, as opposed to production costs, adjusted costs of a given model may diﬀer in the
two countries due to diﬀerent tariﬀ levels or to diﬀerent impacts of the NTBs; therefore c∗a
jt is not
necessarily equal to c∗b
jt.
Stacking the ﬁrst order conditions for the two countries, all time periods and all ﬁrms, the
system can be written as
q(P) + ∆(P)(P − c∗(c,λ,µ,τa,τb)) = 0 (8)
where q(P), P and c∗(c,λ,µ,τa,τb) are the stacked quantity, price and adjusted cost vectors across
ﬁrms, years and countries, and ∆(P) is a block diagonal matrix, with ∆(P)ij = 0 when products i
and j are produced by diﬀerent ﬁrms, sold in diﬀerent countries or in diﬀerent time periods. The
adjusted cost c∗(c,λ,µ,τa,τb) satisﬁes the deﬁnition in (7). This notation will be useful in the
estimation section that follows.
4 Estimation of the supply parameters
This section describes the estimation of the marginal cost of production of each car model and the
shadow cost of the non-tariﬀ barriers - the Lagrange multipliers - described in Section 3. Since
marginal cost may vary over time due to changes in input prices, technical change and other factors,
I estimate a diﬀerent marginal cost per model and per time period.
The estimators are derived from the ﬁrms’ ﬁrst order conditions in (8). Intuitively, the
estimators are deﬁned as the costs of production and shadow costs of NTBs that satisfy the ﬁrm
behavior described in the previous section, given prices, quantities and an estimate of the matrix
of price derivatives. Firms observe marginal costs, the trade restrictions and a demand function for
each model, and choose the optimal prices (and jointly the equilibrium quantities). If the researcher
observes prices, quantities and the matrix of price derivatives, the marginal costs that generated
the observed equilibrium outcome can be estimated under an explicit assumption about how ﬁrms
behave (i.e. the FOCs).
The data consists of information on prices and quantities sold for each car model in each country.
As a ﬁrst step, it is necessary to obtain an estimate of the matrix of price derivatives, as this is









. Once there are available estimates for the demand functions, an estimate for
the matrix of price derivatives, b ∆, can be constructed.
The supply model and the estimation method are general enough that they do not depend on
the speciﬁcation of the demand side. The choice of a demand model depends mainly on available
data (individual vs. aggregate data, long or short time-series) and their diﬀerent implications for
welfare evaluation. I model demand using the random-coeﬃcient logit model of Berry (1994) and
Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). Consumers in Argentina and Brazil are assumed to choose
only one car - or none - among all available models by maximizing a utility function deﬁned
over the characteristics of the diﬀerent products and allowed to vary across individuals based on
household characteristics and random tastes. Since individual purchases data is not available,
the identiﬁcation of heterogenous preferences is achieved through the variance in demographic
composition (individual characteristics) and car model shares (vehicle attributes) across geographic
regions and time periods. Aggregate demand is obtained by aggregating individual choices. 6,7 More
details about the speciﬁcation of the demand side follow in Section 5. In what follows, I describe
the supply-side estimation for any consistent estimate of the matrix of derivatives.
The estimation of the production costs and shadow costs of the NTBs, (c,λ,µ), consists of a
minimum-distance procedure. The estimator is deﬁned as the parameter values that minimize the
system of FOCs given the estimates of the price derivatives, as dictated by the following criterion
function
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Where the vector c∗ (.) represents the adjusted marginal costs deﬁned as a function of the vector
of production costs and the trade policy parameters according to (7), and c W is a square weighting
matrix, with its dimension equal to the number of price equations. For computational simplicity, I
use the identity matrix.
6This same approach has been used in the estimation of demand for cars by Berry (1994), Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999). Goldberg (1995), Petrin (2002) and Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (2004) use other multinomial logit models to estimate demand for automobiles and include data on individual
choices.
7A more straightforward way of modelling aggregate demand for diﬀerentiated products would be to write a full
system with a demand function for each product that depends on all prices and other control variables, like the linear
expenditure demand system (LES) and the almost ideal demand system (AIDS) (see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)).
A limitation in the application of this approach is that the number of demand parameters increases exponentially
with the number of available choices. In the present context, there are many car models available and the demand
parameters easily outnumber the price-quantity observations.
15The estimators for the Lagrange multipliers of the GTB, λ, are constrained to be non-negative.
As a result, their distribution is truncated at zero and asymptotically they are not normally
distributed. Since these parameters are estimated jointly with the costs of production and the
Lagrange multipliers associated to the net quotas, the distribution of these two sets of coeﬃcients
is aﬀected by the truncation and is not normal either.8 To estimate their variance, I take draws from
the estimated distribution of the matrix of price derivatives, recompute the estimates of (c,λ,µ)
for each draw, and calculate 90 percent conﬁdence intervals with the results.
The estimators of the shadow cost of the net quotas, µa
ft and µb
ft, are separately identiﬁed since
the two bounds of the quotas cannot be binding at the same time. If µa
ft −µb
ft is positive, then µa
ft
is positive and µb
ft is zero, and vice versa.
Previous studies use a perfect ﬁt solution of the ﬁrst order conditions to estimate the supply
side. Goldberg (1995) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1999) use a variant of this method to
evaluate the impact of the Japanese VER on exports of cars to the U.S.; Verboven (1996) and
Goldberg and Verboven (2001) to study price discrimination and price dispersion in the European
car market; Petrin (2002) to quantify the eﬀect of the introduction of the minivan; Nevo (2000)
and (2001) to investigate market power and mergers in the cereal industry. In these studies, the
system of FOCs is inverted to get an exactly identiﬁed solution of the marginal costs.9 In some of
these cases, additional costs parameters, such as the shadow cost of trade restrictions, need to be
estimated. The common practice is to specify a cost function and to run an additional regression
in which each car model’s marginal cost (recovered from the inversion of the FOCs) is explained
by its physical attributes and the trade restrictions that apply according to the country of origin
of the car. This later regression allows to separate the marginal cost recovered from the FOCs into
the cost of production and the cost imposed by the trade restrictions.
The minimum distance procedure has considerable advantages over the perfect-ﬁt method. It
provides a test of the model since it is in principle possible to check if the ﬁrst order conditions
are close enough to zero. At the same time, the fact that the minimum-distance estimator of the
two-country case does not satisfy the FOCs does not mean that ﬁrms are not maximizing proﬁts.
The FOCs are satisﬁed when evaluated at the unobserved true value of the demand derivatives,
costs and Lagrange multipliers. Most importantly, there are enough degrees of freedom to estimate
8One consequence is that the distance function is not distributed chi-square and a regular over-identifying
restrictions test cannot be performed in this particular case.
9That does not mean, however, that the vector of marginal costs is estimated without error. There are estimation
errors derived from the fact that the matrix of price derivatives is estimated rather than observed.
16the Lagrange multipliers together with the marginal costs without imposing additional structure
on the cost side. Namely, it is not necessary to make functional form assumptions about the
cost function, and to spread its potential misspeciﬁcation errors to the estimation of the cost
of production and trade policy parameters. From a data point of view, the approach requires
information on sales and prices of the same products in diﬀerent markets (countries, geographic
regions or cities). Intuitively, the system of ﬁrst order conditions is overidentiﬁed due to the fact
that more than one price equation is derived for a same marginal cost of production. In the present
case, there is one price condition for Argentina and one for Brazil.
5 Data and ﬁrst results
The vehicle data consist of semestral observations of sales, average prices and vehicle physical
characteristics from 1996 to 1999, for each car model sold in Argentina and Brazil. Data on sales
by region are available for Argentina but not for Brazil. There are 123 diﬀerent models in Brazil,
and 128 in Argentina, not all of them available in all time periods.10
The estimation of the demand side is based on a multinomial logit model where the utility
relative to the outside alternative that individual i derives from car model j in a combination of









where u denotes the alternative utility when the consumer chooses not to buy a car, p is price, x are
observed model attributes, ξ are model characteristics that are not observed by the econometrician,
and ε is an independent and identically distributed error term that follows a type I extreme-value
distribution. The characteristics that I include in the vector x are length, length squared,
horsepower and dummy variables for hatchback models, station wagons, sport utility vehicles
(SUVs) and minivans.
Consumers are allowed to have diﬀerent tastes over the alternative utility, prices, and some
of the observed characteristics. These variable coeﬃcients are parameterized as a function of
10The data sources for quantities and prices are associations of car dealers and car manufacturers - the Asociaci´ on
de Concesionarios de Autom´ oviles de la Rep´ ublica Argentina (Acara) and the Associa¸ c˜ ao Nacional dos Fabricantes
de Ve´ ıculos Automotores (Anfavea) for Argentina and Brazil, respectively; - data on characteristics of vehicles are
from the specialized publications Megaautos and Quatro Rodas.
17individual characteristics and random tastes. I denote the individual deviation from the mean
alternative utility by Z and assume that they are independent across individuals and follow a






o is the mean alternative utility and uh
1 its standard deviation. The price coeﬃcient depends




it, where y denotes income. The length
coeﬃcient varies with family size. In particular, I interact length with a dummy variable B which





it. The coeﬃcients on all other car attributes are constant across individuals.
Since data for individual purchases of cars is not available, I use the distribution of demographic
variables across populations in diﬀerent markets (time and geographic regions) to identify the
variable part of the coeﬃcients, as proposed by Berry (1994) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
I sample income and family size from household surveys and deviations from the mean alternative
utility from a standard normal.11 I take one hundred draws per semester and country. Households
in Brazil are surveyed only annually. However, the semestral disaggregation of sales, prices and
product characteristics is still important to estimate of the non-random part of the coeﬃcients. In
the Argentine data, household characteristics and sales, but not prices, are disaggregated into four
geographical regions. For the purpose of demand estimation, the regions are diﬀerent markets and
their treatment is analogous to that of diﬀerent time periods.
The term ξ represents a combination of the vehicle characteristics that are observed by customers
and ﬁrms but not by the econometrician. Firms set prices given the demand function, which includes
ξ. In addition, some elements of ξ - for example, the shape of the car - aﬀect production costs.
Thus, price is correlated with ξ both via demand and cost. As price is an explanatory variable
in the demand equation and the unobservables are the error term, instruments are needed to
obtain consistent estimates. Cost shifters (such as input prices) that vary across products could in
principle be used as instruments but I do not have this information available. The standard practice
in the literature is to use demand-side instruments. Equilibrium prices depend on a product’s own
characteristics and also on the characteristics of other alternatives. Intuitively, the price of a car
depends on how close in the space of characteristics it is to other models, and whether these
substitutes are produced by the same ﬁrm or by competitors. The instruments that I use are a
car’s own characteristics, an aggregate of the characteristics of the models manufactured by the
11I use the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) for Argentina, and the Pesquisa Nacional por Amostra de
Domic´ ılios (PNAD) for Brazil.
18same ﬁrm, and an aggregate of the characteristics of all models in the market.12 The identifying
assumption is that unobservable characteristics are independent from observable characteristics.
Results from the estimation of the demand coeﬃcients are shown in Table 2. The ﬁrst two rows
correspond to the alternative utility. The estimates are ˆ ua
it = 13.5−0.9×Za
it and ˆ ub
it = 7.7−0.8×Zb
it,
which implies that the estimated distributions of the reservation utilities are ua
i ∼ N (13.5,0.9) and
ub
i ∼ N (7.7,0.8).13 The main results are the price coeﬃcients, shown in the second two rows. The
estimates are ˆ αa
it = 0.19 + 0.17/ya
it and ˆ αb
it = 0.09 − 0.03/yb
it in Argentina and Brazil, respectively.
The coeﬃcients on length and horsepower have the expected signs and the marginal utility of length
is larger for families with more than two children. Utility is higher for hatchback models, SUVs and
minivans, and lower for station wagons, all relative to sedan models. The average price coeﬃcient
over the sample of consumers is 0.25 in Argentina and 0.08 in Brazil.
Using the individual price coeﬃcients and the functional form for the demand functions, which
can be derived from (10) obtaining the usual multinomial logit form for market shares, I compute
estimated own and cross-price derivatives and elasticities for each car and each time period. I take
a sample of 1300 and 2000 individuals per period and region in Argentina and Brazil, respectively,
combine their demographic information with the estimates of the demand function parameters,
compute the individual derivatives and elasticities, and aggregate them at the national level. The
estimates of the price derivatives are used in the estimation of the supply parameters.
On the supply side, I estimate the marginal cost for each car model in each period of time in
which the model is available. For each ﬁrm, I estimate two Lagrange multipliers for the global
trade balance constraint (GTB), one for Argentina and one for Brazil, and eight multipliers for the
bilateral quotas (four years and two countries).
Table 3 displays the average price and the estimated elasticity, production cost and percentage
mark-up by country and origin. In Argentina, the mean elasticity is 3.4, and the mean price and
production cost are 16,700 and 11,300 dollars, respectively, with an average price-cost margin of
50 percent.14 Production cost is on average lower for domestic than Brazilian cars (10,600 and
11,600 dollars), while elasticities are similar. However, the price of domestic cars is on average
12Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) show that these instruments are optimal.
13Note that the coeﬃcients of the deviations enter the equation with negative sign. This is a consequence of using
the same distribution - a standard normal - for all markets. When markets are identical, the signs of the coeﬃcients
are not identiﬁed, in the sense that the vector −Z generates the same choices as Z. Still the inclusion of this variable
is relevant because the variance of the mean utility is recovered.
14Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) estimates of own-price elasticity are relatively higher. The lowest elasticity
that they report is 3, for the Lexus in 1983.
19higher (15,700 dollars compared to 15,100). This ﬁnding reﬂects the GTBs and the inter-country
interaction of ﬁrms. I argue below that the GTBs are more restrictive in Brazil and that Argentine
subsidiaries set lower prices for Brazilian goods to encourage Brazilian exports. The average cost
of extra-zone imports is higher than the average cost of Mercosur vehicles (14,700 dollars).
In Brazil, demand elasticity is relatively low (1.7), while the average percentage mark-up is 60
percent, 10 percent higher than in Argentina. The mean production cost of Mercosur cars is about
a thousand dollars lower in Brazil than in Argentina. This is the result of diﬀerent compositions of
demand, as the cost of a given product is by assumption the same in both countries. The price of
imports from Argentina is higher than the price of domestic cars (15,900 dollars compared to 14,300
dollars), while costs are very similar (9,500 and 9,400 dollars) and demand elasticity is higher for
Argentine cars. This ﬁnding is the opposite of what occurs in Argentina and it is explained by the
same argument: Argentine imports are discouraged in Brazil because the GTB is more restrictive.
The average price of extra-zone imports is 29,000 dollars, which is high compared to the production
cost, the mark-up, and the price in Argentina.
The Lagrange multipliers for the GTB are displayed in the ﬁrst two columns of Table 4. Since
the constraint is intertemporal there is only one multiplier per ﬁrm and country (λa
f and λb
f). The
Lagrange multipliers represent the increase in marginal costs of imports from third countries due
to the trade balance constraint, as deﬁned in Equation (7). For example, in the case of General
Motors, the augmented marginal cost of outside imports in Argentina is 40 percent higher than the
cost of production of these models. In Brazil, these increases in marginal cost range from 14 to 62
percent. Whereas in Argentina, several multipliers are zero, which signals that the price decisions
of those ﬁrms would be similar without the Argentine GTB. The Lagrange multipliers are non-zero
for Ford, General Motors, Peugeot-Citro¨ en and Chrysler.
There are additional considerations when computing the augmented cost of imports from the
Mercosur partner (see Equation (7)): internal imports tighten one GTB but loosen the other. A
vehicle that is exported from Argentina to Brazil, tightens the Brazilian GTB by λb
f percent and
loosens the Argentine GTB by 1.2λa
f percent. The third and fourth columns of Table 4 show the





These diﬀerences can be negative. In the case of Ford, for example, the adjusted cost of internal
imports in Argentina is 25 percent lower than the production cost. The opposite happens in Brazil,
where the cost of Argentine products is 3 percent higher than the production cost. The decrease in
20costs of internal imports in Argentina ranges from 11 to 57 percent. In Brazil, the cost of internal
imports increases between 3 and 48 percent, with the exception of General Motors, whose costs
decrease by 5 percent.
The fact that the cost of imports from Brazil is lower in Argentina than the production cost of
these vehicles intuitively indicates that prices of these models are lower and exports are higher than
what they would be if there was no GTB. Firms face a tighter constraint on outside imports in
Brazil (ﬁrst two columns) and therefore export to Argentina to get export credits in Brazil. This is
further explored in Section 6. The bilateral quota on net imports imposes a limit to the possibilities
to arbitrage until the marginal costs in the two countries are equalized.
Table 5 reports the estimates of the Lagrange multipliers for the bilateral quotas. I estimate
the diﬀerence µ0 = µa − µb. If this diﬀerence is positive I assign the values ˆ µa = ˆ µ0 and ˆ µb = 0,
and vice versa when the diﬀerence is negative. A positive value for µa and a zero for µb, as is the
case for the Volkswagen corporation in 1996, means that Argentine net internal imports are as high
as allowed by the quota (the lower bound of the constraint is met). In other words, the Argentine
subsidiary is importing from Brazil as much as possible without a further increase in its exports.
The opposite happens when µb is positive, as is the case of Chrysler in 1997. In the majority of the
cases, µa is positive and µb is zero. This is consistent with the results in Table 5 that suggest that
the GTB constraint works in the direction of increasing Argentine imports of Brazilian products.15
The diﬀerence µa −µb is interpreted as the additional cost imposed by the bilateral quota (it is
not a percentage increase). In the case of Volkswagen in 1996, Brazilian products sold in Argentina
exceed their production cost by 170 dollars, while the cost of Argentine models sold in Brazil is 170
dollars lower.
The fact that the µ’s are diﬀerent across ﬁrms suggests that the quotas were ineﬃciently
distributed among the corporations and that ﬁrms could beneﬁt from trading import rights among
each other.
6 Counterfactual customs union equilibrium
The model and estimates from the previous sections describe the equilibrium under the trade
regime during 1996-1999, the convergence period, characterized by the presence of non-tariﬀ barriers
15Notice that the bilateral constraint, which in most cases restricts Argentine internal imports, is likely to mitigate
the eﬀect of the GTB.
21(NTBs) and diﬀerent tariﬀ schedules in the two countries. In this section, I study the eﬀects of
forming a customs union on trade ﬂows, prices and welfare. I compute two additional equilibria:
one equilibrium without NTBs, in which the GTB constraint and the bilateral quota for net imports
are removed but the tariﬀ schedules remain unchanged, and one equilibrium that mimics the full











denote the counterfactual equilibria in the two additional cases. The
three equilibria can be summarized as follows
Convergence Period No NTBs Customs Union
τa,τb τa,τb τ = 35%
Global trade balance (λ) λ = 0 λ = 0
Quota for net imports (µ) µ = 0 µ = 0
q0,P0 q1,P1 q2,P2
By introducing the equilibrium without NTBs, I decompose the transition to a customs union into
two sequential changes in policy: the removal of NTBs (given the asymmetric tariﬀ schedule) and
the adoption of a common external tariﬀ (given that the NTBs were already removed).
Using the estimators of the structural parameters of demand and supply, I simulate the












I measure the impact of the adoption of the common external tariﬀ. The
sum of the two eﬀects accounts for the total change due to a transition to a customs union.
Notice that this counterfactual exercise provides an estimate of what the eﬀect of a customs
union would have been during the period 1996-1999. It is not a prediction of the equilibrium that
will occur when the customs union is adopted. The later depends on variables that are exogenous
to the model, such as income and characteristics of the available car models.
To compute the two counterfactual equilibria, I introduce the counterfactual trade policy
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Since there are no NTBs in neither of the two computed equilibria, the Lagrange multipliers are
zero.16 Trade between partners is free and the relevant costs are the marginal costs of production.
The adjustment in costs only includes the tariﬀ on imports from the rest of the world. The
elimination of NTBs makes the inter-country strategic component irrelevant and ﬁrms set prices




satisﬁes the system of ﬁrst order conditions given the estimated
demand function and marginal costs. Let q (P,θ) denote the demand function (with the demand
parameters summarized by the vector θ), ∆(P,θ) the matrix of cross price derivatives, b θ the
estimator of the demand parameters, and b c the estimator of the marginal costs of production. The
estimator

c q1, c P1

solves17
q(c P1, b θ) + ∆(c P1, b θ)

c P1 − c∗(b c,λ = 0,µ = 0,τa,τb)

= 0
c q1=q(c P1, b θ)
16The Lagrange multipliers are reduced form parameters. Their estimators are valid only for the particular trade
policy during the convergence period. Hence, the only counterfactual equilibria that can be consistently simulated
are those that involve removing all NTBs. The value of the Lagrange multipliers is known to be zero in these cases.










works in practice like a contraction mapping and reaches a unique ﬁxed-point in a small number of iterations.




q(c P2, b θ) + ∆(c P2, b θ)

c P2 − c∗(b c,λ = 0,µ = 0,τa = τb = 35%)

= 0
c q2=q(c P2, b θ)
By comparing quantities and prices in the diﬀerent equilibria I estimate the changes in trade
ﬂows, proﬁts and tariﬀ revenue and I decompose these changes into those caused by the elimination
of NTBs and those caused by the adoption of a uniform tariﬀ.
To measure the change in consumers’ welfare I use the compensating variation, deﬁned as the
negative of the change in income that leaves utility unchanged after a change in prices. In the
comparison of the equilibrium without NTBs and the observed convergence period equilibrium,


























This is the change in individual welfare due to the elimination of NTBs. The change due to the
adoption of a common external tariﬀ is given by the additional change in income, ∆y
2,h


























To compute the change in aggregate welfare I take a sample of 1,300 and 2,000 individuals for
each time period-region combination in Argentina and Brazil, respectively (only time periods for




it that solve (13) and (14)
given the estimator of utility parameters b θ for each sampled individual and calculate the average
change in income across individuals.18 The aggregate change in welfare is the average change in
income multiplied by the market size.
I estimate the variance of the estimated quantities and prices, of the change in the trade ﬂows,
proﬁts and tariﬀ revenue, and of the compensating variation by taking draws of b θ from its asymptotic
18The change in income for each individual does not have a closed form solution; I take draws of ε for each car
model from a type-I extreme-value distribution and numerically search over diﬀerent changes in income; each step
involves ﬁnding the preferred car model.
24distribution and recomputing all estimators for each sampled value of θ .19,20 The estimators are
not normal because of the non-negativity constraint imposed in the estimation of the Lagrange
multipliers in the cost side.
Results
Table 6 shows the proportional changes in prices of imports and trade volumes due to the
changes in policy. The ﬁrst two columns show the changes in external imports in Argentina and
Brazil; the total eﬀect is decomposed to capture the eﬀect of the elimination of the NTBs and
the adoption of the common external tariﬀ. Both changes in policies have the expected results.
The elimination of the trade balance constraint results in a sales-weighted average decrease in the
price of external imports of 15 percent in Argentina and 10 percent in Brazil; the number of cars
imported from other countries increases by 78 percent and 117 percent in Argentina and Brazil,
respectively.
The increase in the tariﬀ level due to the adoption of the common external tariﬀ has the opposite
eﬀect. Prices of external imports go up by 12 percent in Argentina and 0.7 percent in Brazil - the
increase is small in Brazil because the counterfactual change in the tariﬀ level is not high. The
number of imported cars decreases by 72 percent in Argentina and 4 percent in Brazil. All these
changes (both due to the elimination of NTBs and to the adoption of the common external tariﬀ)
are signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.21
Overall, the eﬀect of the elimination of the NTBs predominates and there is a net increase in
imports from the rest of the world although a customs union is formed. The trade creating eﬀect
of the elimination of the NTBs more than compensates the trade diverting eﬀect of the higher
external tariﬀ. In Argentina the overall eﬀect is relatively small - the average increase in price is 3
percent; the number of imported units increases by 6 percent - and not statistically signiﬁcant. In
Brazil the eﬀect of the change in the external tariﬀ is very small and the overall change is mostly
19Berry, Linton and Pakes (2004) provide a formal proof of the consistency and asymptotic normality of the Berry
(1994) and Berry, Levinsohh and Pakes (1995) estimator of demand.
20Notice that for each draw it is also necessary to reestimate the marginal costs and Lagrange multipliers.
21I do not compute 95 percent conﬁdence intervals. This computation would involve the estimation of the 2.5 and
9.7 percentiles, which would require a large number of simulated draws as they are further away from the median.
Additionally, as can be seen in the 90 percent conﬁdence intervals, the distribution is not symmetric. The long
tail on one side adds diﬃculty to the precise estimation of the limiting percentiles. Note also that this asymmetry
makes it impossible to compare the variance of the estimators to the variance that would arise from a standard
normal distribution. In particular, the 70 percent conﬁdence intervals in the skewed distribution (not shown) are
substantially smaller than the 70 percent intervals that would result from the hypothetical normal distributions that
yield the 90 percent conﬁdence intervals displayed in Table 6.
25explained by the positive eﬀect of the elimination of the NTBs.
The last two columns show the changes in bilateral trade ﬂows and prices. As was expected
from the estimation of the Lagrange multipliers, imports from Brazil to Argentina are artiﬁcially
high due to the GTB. The cost imposed by the GTB is larger in Brazil and ﬁrms have incentives
to switch export credits from Brazil to Argentina; the perceived cost of imports from Brazil to
Argentina is lower than the cost of production. Once this distortion is removed by eliminating the
GTB, the cost of Brazilian cars becomes higher in Argentina and prices of these vehicles go up (7
percent in average). The opposite happens in Brazil, where the price of Argentine vehicles decrease
by 5 percent. Bilateral imports decrease in one direction and increase in the other. The estimates
are relatively large in magnitude (43 and 13 percent respectively) but not precisely estimated and
zero falls within the 90 percent conﬁdence interval. The net eﬀect is an increase in bilateral trade
(not shown in the table).
Bilateral trade increases due to the increase in the external tariﬀ (trade diversion). In Argentina
both changes move in opposite directions with the net eﬀect being negative. Imports from Brazil
are reduced after the counterfactual customs union is adopted. In Brazil, both changes dictate an
increase in bilateral trade.
Table 7 displays the changes in welfare levels after both changes in policy. On average, prices
go down by 659 dollars in Argentina and up by 205 dollars in Brazil and as a result consumers
are better oﬀ in the ﬁrst country and worse oﬀ in the second. Argentine consumers gain 393
dollars per vehicle sold whereas their Brazilian peers lose 204 per vehicle. When aggregating the
two countries, consumers are worse oﬀ (not shown in table). Revenue increases in both countries
since the counterfactual tariﬀ level is higher and imports are also higher due to the removal of the
NTBs. The aggregate domestic welfare change (compensating variation plus tariﬀ revenue, without
including ﬁrms’ proﬁts since they are foreign-owned) are positive in both countries (not shown).
Firm proﬁts decrease by 22 percent in Argentina and increase by 5.7 percent in Brazil; the net
eﬀect is a gain for ﬁrms, which can be interpreted as a shift in proﬁts from one country to the
other.22
22The percentage increase in Brazil is smaller than the percentage decrease in Argentina, however, being that Brazil
is a larger country, the opposite happens when considering levels.
267 Conclusions
After estimating a model of demand and supply for cars in Argentina and Brazil that incorporates
two non-tariﬀ barriers (a quota on bilateral net imports and a trade balance constraint), I predict
the eﬀects of fully including the automobile sector in the Mercosur agreement. The trade reform
involves the removal of NTBs and the adoption of a common external tariﬀ. One of the main
ﬁndings is that the eﬀects on prices, trade and welfare are driven by the removal of NTBs rather
than by the convergence to a common external tariﬀ.
The elimination of the NTBs comprises a movement towards free trade that leads to an increase
in external imports (countries from outside the customs union) both in Argentina and Brazil. On
the other hand, the interaction between the trade balance constraint and the ownership structure
of the ﬁrms (multinational corporations with subsidiaries in both countries) leads to asymmetric
eﬀects on bilateral trade and welfare for each partner when these restrictions are removed. This
asymmetry is also observed in the total eﬀects of the customs union. In particular, I ﬁnd that for
most ﬁrms, the trade balance constraints create an incentive to export from Brazil to Argentina.
When these particular NTBs are removed, bilateral imports decrease in Argentina and increase in
Brazil, with an overall increase in bilateral trade.
Consumers in Argentina are better oﬀ after the customs union, while they are worse oﬀ in Brazil.
The opposite is true for proﬁts of Argentine and Brazilian subsidiaries. Tariﬀ revenue increases in
both countries, and in Brazil more than compensates the loss suﬀered by consumers.
By modeling the behavior of ﬁrms in two countries, rather than in one, I am able to capture
an additional strategic component of ﬁrm behavior - the interaction across markets. In addition,
from a methodological point of view, the data on two diﬀerent markets allows me to estimate the
supply parameters (including the shadow cost of the trade policy constraints) by minimum distance
instead of by a perfect ﬁt method, and without the need to make functional form assumptions on
the cost side as is the usual practice in the literature.
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28Table 1: Market Share of Each Corporation. 1996-1999.
Argentina
All Domestic Imports External
Models Models from Partner Imports
Fiat 23.3 29.4 10.0 8.7
Renault 22.4 28.9 2.3 12.5
Volkswagen 15.7 17.4 1.0 21.6
Ford 15.5 7.2 49.4 20.7
Peugeot-Citroen 12.2 12.4 0 22.5
General Motors 8.2 4.0 35.1 1.9
Chrysler 1.2 0.6 0 5.0
Toyota 0.8 0.1 0.5 3.9
Honda 0.6 0.05 1.4 2.2
Mercedes Benz 0.2 0.02 0.4 1.0
Total number of units 1,047,730 730,065 150,710 166,955
Total share by origin 69.7 14.4 15.9
Brazil
All Domestic Imports External
Models Models from Partner Imports
Volkswagen 32.4 29.8 46.0 39.1
Fiat 29.3 32.0 18.2 7.8
General Motors 23.2 27.2 4.9 0
Ford 11.1 9.3 21.1 15.9
Renault 1.2 0.4 5.8 2.7
Peugeot-Citroen 1.0 0 2.2 18.5
Honda 0.7 0.8 0 2.5
Chrysler 0.5 0 1.4 7.2
Toyota 0.3 0.2 0.3 3.8
Mercedes Benz 0.3 0.2 0.1 2.7
Total number of units 5,176,605 4,283,403 698,431 194,771
Total share by origin 82.7 13.5 3.8
Source: own calculations based on sales data from ACARA (Argentina) and ANFAVEA (Brazil).
Market shares of each corporation are expressed as percentages.
29Table 2: Utility Function Parameters.
Argentina Brazil
Constant (−uo) -13.5 -7.7
(27.4) (33.4)
Constant*N(0,1) (−u1) 0.9 0.8
(0.6) (0.9)
Price (−α0) -0.19*** -0.09***
(0.05) (0.03)
Price*1/Income (−α1) -0.17** 0.03***
(0.08) (0.01)
Length (βLength,0) 4.2*** 0.4**
(0.3) (0.2)
Length*More than 2 children (βLength,1) 1.0 0.4
(0.5) (14.7)




Hatchback Dummy 0.1 0.4
(0.5) (1.0)
Station Wagon Dummy -0.7** -0.6***
(0.3) (0.2)
SUV or Minivan Dummy 0.5 0.5
(1.5) (0.5)
Category Dummies Yes Yes
Test of Overidentifying Restrictions 20.84 17.45
Critical Value: 23.68
Mean price coeﬃcient -0.25 -0.08
(0.11) (0.03)
Standard errors are reported in parenthesis; *** signiﬁcant at the 1% level; ** signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. The null hypothesis of the test of overidentifying restrictions sustains
that the orthogonality conditions of the GMM estimator of the demand parameters are
statistically not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.
30Table 3: Price, Demand Elasticity, Production Cost, and Mark-ups. 1996-1999.
All Domestic Imports from External
Models Models Partner Imports
Argentina
Number of Vehicles 1,047,730 730,065 150,710 166,955
Mean Price (thousands) 16.7 15.7 15.1 22.4
Mean Price Elasticity -3.4 -3.3 -3.3 -3.7
(0.2) (0.2) (0.2) (0.9)
Mean Production Cost (thousands) 11.3 10.5 11.6 14.7
[9, 14] [9, 13] [10, 14] [11, 17]
Mean Percentage Mark-up 50 53 37 48
[42, 79] [51, 76] [15, 72] [34, 96]
Brazil
Number of Vehicles 5,176,605 4,283,403 698,431 194,771
Mean Price (thousands) 15.1 14.3 15.9 29.0
Mean Price Elasticity -1.7 -1.5 -1.8 -4.0
(0.3) (0.1) (0.2) (0.5)
Mean Production Cost (thousands) 9.7 9.5 9.4 15.3
[6, 11] [6, 10] [6, 10] [12, 17]
Mean Percentage Mark-up 60 62 52 39
[14, 123] [14, 124] [11, 131] [26, 84]
Prices and production costs are measure in thousands of dollars. The estimators of the production costs and
mark-ups are not normally distributed; conﬁdence intervals at the 10% signiﬁcance level are reported between
square brackets. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis for the mean price elasticities.
31Table 4: Global Trade Balance Constraint (GTB).
Adjustment in Cost Adjustment in Cost
of External Imports of Imports from Partner
Argentina Brazil Argentina Brazil
λa λb λa − 1.2λb λb − 1.2λa
Chrysler 0.02 0.29** -0.33* 0.27*
(0.15) (0.01) [-4.36, -0.02] [0.02, 0.35]
Fiat 0 0.15** -0.19* 0.15*
(0.87) (0.03) [-0.36, -1.2] [0.01, 0.30]
Ford 0.50 0.62** -0.25* 0.03
(0.43) (0.01) [-0.30, -0.01] [-0.25, 0.24]
General Motors 0.40 0.43** -0.11 -0.05
(0.15) (0.00) [-0.25, 0.09] [-0.20, 0.21]
Honda 0 0.37** -0.45* 0.37*
(0.98) (0.00) [-0.71, -0.27] [0.22, 0.59]
Mercedes Benz 0 0.15 -0.18 0.15
(0.58) (0.24) [-0.61, 0.12] [-0.15, 0.51]
Peugeot-Citroen 0.30 0.43* -0.21 0.07
(0.38) (0.10) [-2.00, 0.03] [-0.05, 0.63]
Renault 0 0.48* -0.57* 0.48*
(0.99) (0.00) [-0.94, -0.36] [0.30, 0.78]
Toyota 0 0.27** -0.33* 0.27*
(0.91) (0.00) [-1.00, -0.11] [0.09, 0.84]
Volkswagen 0 0.14** -0.16* 0.14
(0.80) (0.04) [-0.44, -0.01] [0.01, 0.37]
The ﬁrst two columns display the estimates of the Lagrange Multipliers for the Global Trade
Balance Constraint (GTB). They reﬂect the percentage additional cost on external imports
imposed by the GTB. The estimators are constrained to be non-negative. The estimated
probability that the estimator is equal to zero is displayed in parenthesis. ** indicates diﬀerent
from zero at the 5% signiﬁcance level (one-sided test) and * at the 10% level.
The last two columns display the estimated additional cost that the GTB imposes on bilateral
imports, taking into consideration that an imported unit involves a credit for the exporting
partner country. The estimators are not normally distributed; 90% conﬁdence intervals are
reported in square brackets. * indicates that the estimator is signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
32Table 5: Quota on Bilateral Net Imports.
1996 1997 1998 1999
µa µb µa µb µa µb µa µb
Chrysler - - 0 2.41* 0 0.94 0.76* 0
Fiat 0.16 0 0.19 0 0.18 0 1.82* 0
Ford 0.04 0 0.15 0 0.25 0 0.76* 0
General Motors 0 0.29 0.32 0 0.30 0 0.54* 0
Honda - - 0.59 0 4.22* 0 5.94* 0
Mercedes Benz - - - - 0 0.18 2.05* 0
Peugeot-Citroen 0 0.75* 0 0.33 0.18 0 0.82* 0
Renault 0 0.40* 0.20 0 0.55* 0 1.89* 0
Toyota - - - - 0 0.38* 4.01* 0
Volkswagen 0.17* 0 0.27* 0 0.30* 0 1.13* 0
The table displays the Lagrange multipliers associated to the quota on net bilateral imports. They represent
the additional cost, in thousands of dollars, imposed by the quota on imports from the partner country. A dash
(-) indicates no bilateral trade. The estimators are not normally distributed; a star (*) indicates that zero does
not fall into the 10 percent conﬁdence interval.




Average change in price -15% [-23, -9] -10% [-23, -9]
Change in number of units 78% [31, 821] 117% [69, 399]
Adoption of common external tariﬀ
Average change in price 12% [10, 13] 0.7% [0.5, 0.8]
Change in number of units -72% [-625, -45] -4% [-10, -2]
Overall customs union eﬀect
Average change in price -3% [-13, 5] -9% [-21, -0.5]




Average change in price 7% [-21, 8] 5% [28, 2]
Change in number of units -43% [-96, 15] 13% [-14, 20]
Adoption of common external tariﬀ
Average change in price -0.12% [-0.55, 0.52] 0.007% [0.006, 0.03]
Change in number of units 7% [5, 33] 0.13% [0.10, 0.81]
Overall customs union eﬀect
Average change in price 7% [-21, 8] -5% [-28, -2]
Change in number of units -36% [-66, 23] 13% [-14, 21]
The average change in price is weighted by sales. The estimators are not normally distributed; 90%
conﬁdence intervals are reported in square brackets.
34Table 7: Welfare Changes from Adopting a Customs Union.
Argentina Brazil
Change in prices (dollars) -659 205
[-2672, -551] [-4248, 323]
Compensating variation 393 -204
[-9398, 1386] [-332, 607]
Change in revenue (percentage) 162% 210%
[77, 619] [158, 384]
Change in proﬁts (percentage) -22% 5.7%
[-26, 14] [-10, 4]
The compensating variation is computed per number of vehicles and reported in
dollars. The estimators are not normally distributed; 90% conﬁdence intervals are
reported in square brackets.
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